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This paper deals with the philosophical problems concerned with research in the  field of artificial 
intelligence (AI), in particular with problems arising out of claims that AI exhibits ‘consciousness’, 
‘thinking’ and other ‘inner’ processes and that they simulate human intelligence and cognitive 
processes in general. The argument is to show how Cartesian mind is non-mechanical. Descartes’ 
concept of ‘I think’ presupposes subjective experience, because it is ‘I’ who experiences the world. 
Likewise, Descartes’ notion of ‘I’ negates the notion of computationality of the mind. The essence of 
mind is thought and the acts of thoughts are identified with the acts of consciousness. Therefore, it 
follows that cognitive acts are conscious acts, but not computational acts. Thus, for Descartes, one of 
the most important aspects of cognitive states and processes is their phenomenality, because our 
judgments, understanding, etc. can be defined and explained only in relation to consciousness and not 
in relation to computationality. We can only find computationality in machines and not in the mind, 
which wills, understands and judges.  
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It is not wrong to compare Descartes’ idea with the idea 
of artificial intelligence (AI). Although the association of 
Descartes’ name with the notion of AI is bound to cause 
some surprise both to the followers of Descartes and AI 
scientists, the term ‘AI’, even though unnamed, was 
already born in the period when Descartes was alive. It is 
true that AI is a distinct discipline, yet its philosophical 
problems are very important in the present scenario. In 
the modern philosophy, we find that Descartes was 
wondering whether or not it would be possible to create a 
machine that would be phenomenologically indistin-
guishable from man. He also advocated that animals are 
simply machines and human beings, if someone is set to 
possess an immaterial soul, might also simply be 
considered as machines. One important concern is 
manifestation of his consideration of what it would mean 
to say that a machine thinks (Descartes, 2003). 
We know what AI is and what it does in our unreflective 
moments. As such, when AI scientists ascribe the mental 
qualities or mind to machines, then this mechanistic 
construction of mind brings about many philosophical 
issues. This paper deals with philosophical problems 
connected with research in  the  field  of  AI,  in  particular 
with problems arising from claims that AI exhibits 
‘consciousness’, ‘thinking’ and other ‘inner’ processes 
and that they simulate human intelligence and cognitive 
process in general. This paper deals with how Descartes’ 
idea of mind is non-mechanistic. The study shall begin by 
giving a brief characterization of AI and how it defines 
mind. Secondly, an attempt will be made to understand 
the nature of mind presupposed by artificial intelligence. 
As such, the study shall discuss about the nature of mind 
because without proper understanding of Descartes’ 
notion of mind, it is impossible to discuss contemporary 
philosophy of mind. Lastly, there is an argument that 
Descartes’ idea of mind is non-mechanistic because the 
way AI scientists define mind is completely mechanistic 
and to which the notion of computationality is applicable 
and the mental qualities are credible to machines, but not 
to minds. The main aim in this paper is to clarify 
Descartes’ notion of mind from a subjective point of view. 
It is believed that Descartes’ notion of mind cannot be 
explained or characterized in an artificial intelligence 
approach and that they are the subjective mental states 
which we can seen from the first-person perspective of 
their proper understanding.     
 






Artificial intelligence attempts to understand intelligent 
entities; but unlike philosophy, which is concerned with 
intelligence, AI strives to build intelligent entities as well 
as understand them. There are many philosophers and 
many scientists who define AI differently. Haugeland 
defines artificial intelligence as, “the exciting new effort to 
make computers think…. machines with minds, in the full 
and literal sense” (Haugeland, 1989). On the other hand, 
according to Bellman, it is “the automation of activities 
that we associate with human thinking and activities such 
as decision making, problem of solving learning…”( 
Bellman, 1978). Let us look at these two definitions from 
different angles. Here, Haugeland and Bellman point out 
that artificial intelligence is concerned with thought 
process and reasoning. They have explained the 
machines as a mind that is completely associated with 
human thinking, that is to say, computers do think. 
People with widely varying back-grounds and 
professional knowledge are contributing new ideas and 
introducing new tools in this discipline. Cognitive 
psychologists have developed new models of the mind 
based on the fundamental concepts of artificial 
intelligence, symbols, systems and information pro-
cessing. Linguists are also interested in these basic 
notions while developing different models in computa-
tional linguistics, and philosophers, in considering the 
progress, problems and potential of this work towards 
non-human intelligence, have sometimes found solution 
to the age-old problems of the nature of mind and 
knowledge.  
However, we know that artificial intelligence is a part of 
computer science in which there are designed intelligent 
systems that exhibit the characteristics we associate with 
intelligence in human behaviour, understanding language 
learning, reasoning, problem solving and so on.  It is 
believed that insights into the nature of the mind can be 
gained by studying the operation of such systems. 
Artificial intelligence researchers have invented dozens of 
programming techniques that support intelligent 
behaviour. As such, artificial intelligence research may 
have impact on science and technology in the following 
way: 
 
(i) It can solve some difficult problems in chemistry, 
biology, geology, engineering and medicine.  
(ii)  It can manipulate robotic devices to perform some 
useful, repetitive and sensory-motor tasks. 
 
Besides, artificial intelligence researchers investigated 
different kinds of computation and different ways of 
describing computation in an effort not just to create 
intelligent artifacts, but also to understand what 
intelligence is. According to Charniak and McDermott, 
(Tanimoto, 1987), their basic tenet is to create computers 





of intelligent activity of human beings in various ways. 
The hypothesis of artificial intelligence and its 
corollaries are empirical in nature whose truth or falsity is 
to be determined by experiment and empirical test. The 
method of testing the results of artificial intelligence 
comprises the following:  
 
(i) In the narrow sense, artificial intelligence is part of 
computer science, aimed at exploring the range of tasks 
over which computers can be programmed to behave 
intelligently. Thus, it is the study of the ways computers 
can be made to perform cognitive tasks, which generally 
human beings undertake.  
(ii) In the wider sense, artificial intelligence is aimed at 
programs that simulate the actual processes that human 
beings undergo in their intelligent behavior, and these 
simulated programs are taken as theories describing and 
explaining human performance.  Moreover, they are 
tested by comparing the computer output with the human 
behaviour to determine whether both the result and also 
the actual behaviour of computers and persons are 
closely similar (Simon, 1987).  
 
A digital computer is also an example of a physical 
symbol system, a system that has the capability of input, 
output, storing, etc., following different courses of 
operation. These systems are capable of producing 
intelligence depending on the level of mechanical 
sophistication they have. The computers with these 
capabilities behave intelligently like human beings, 
according to the AI researchers.  
 
 
MIND IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
Here, the states of mind in artificial intelligence will be 
explored. As we know, the main aim of artificial 
intelligence is to reproduce mental mechanisms in 
machines. That is to say, AI aims at producing machines 
with mind. Therefore, artificial intelligence is the discipline 
that attempts to understand the nature of human 
intelligence through the construction of computer 
programs that imitate intelligent behavior. It also 
emphasizes the functions of the human brain and the 
analogical functioning of the digital computer.  If we say 
that machines have minds, then we have to ascribe 
certain ‘belief’, ‘knowledge’, ‘free will’, ‘intention’, 
‘observations’, etc. to a machine. In that case, the 
machines will perform intelligent tasks and thus will 
behave like human beings. According to one extreme 
view, the human brain is just a digital computer and the 
mind is a computer program. This view, as John Searle 
calls it, is strong artificial intelligence (Searle, 1996). 
According to strong artificial intelligence, “the 
appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs 
and outputs literally has a mind in exactly the same 






devices would not only refer to being intelligent and have 
minds, but mental qualities of a sort  that can be 
attributed to teleological functioning of any computational 
device, even to the very simplest mechanical ones such 
as a thermostat. Here, the idea is that mental activity is 
simply the carrying out of some well-defined operations, 
frequently referred to as an algorithm. We may ask here 
as to what an algorithm actually is. It will be adequate to 
define an algorithm simply as a calculation procedure of 
some kind, but in the case of thermostat, the algorithm is 
extremely simple: the device registers whether the 
temperature is greater or smaller than the setting and 
then, it arranges for the circuit to be disconnected in the 
former case and to remain connected in the latter. For 
understanding any significant kind of mental activity of a 
human brain, a very complex set of algorithms has to be 
designed to capture the complexity of the human mental 
activities. As such, the digital computers are 
approximations of the complex human brain.  
The strong artificial intelligence view is that the 
differences between the essential functioning of a human 
being (including all its conscious manifestations) and that 
of a computer lie only in the much greater complication in 
the case of the brain. All mental qualities such as 
thinking, feeling, intelligence, etc., are to be regarded, 
according to this view, merely as aspects of this 
complicated functioning of the brain; that is to say that 
they are the features of the algorithm being carried out by 
the brain. The brain functions like a digital computer 
according to this view. Therefore, the supporters of 
strong AI hold that the human brain functions like a 
Turing machine which carries out all sets of complicated 
computations. The brain is naturally designed like a 
computing machine to think, calculate and carry out 
algorithmic activities. To strong AI supporters, the 
activities of the brain are simply algorithmic activities 
which give rise to all mental phenomena like thinking, 
feeling, willing, etc. 
The field of artificial intelligence is devoted in large part 
to the goal of reproducing mental activities in computa-
tional machines. The supporters of strong AI argue that 
we have every reason to believe that eventually 
computers will truly have minds.  Winston says, 
“Intelligent robots must sense, move and reason” 
(Winston, 1984). Accordingly, intelligent behaviour is 
interpreted as giving rise to abstract automation. That is 
to say that an artificial, non-biological system could thus 
be the sort of thing that could give rise to conscious 
experience. For the supporters of strong AI, humans are 
indeed machines and in particular, our mental behaviour 
is finally the result of the mechanical activities of the 
brain. The basic idea of the computer model of the mind 
is that the mind is the software and the brain is the 
hardware of a computational system. The slogan is: “the 
mind is to the program, as the brain is to the hardware” 
(Searle, 1990). For strong AI, there is no distinction 
between brain processes and mental processes, because 




the process which is happening in the brain is a 
computational process and the mind is the alternative 
name of   the brain which is a machine.  
The theory of computation deals wholly with abstract 
objects such as turning machine, Pascal program, finite-
state-automation and so on. These abstract objects are 
formal structures which are implemented in formal 
systems. However, the notion of implementation is the 
relation between abstract computational objects and 
physical systems. Thus, computations are often imple-
mented in synthetic silicon based computers, whereas, 
the computational systems are abstract objects with a 
formal structure determined by their states and state 
transition relations, in which the physical systems are 
concrete objects with a causal structure determined by 
their internal states and the causal relations between the 
states. It may be pointed out that a physical system 
implements a computation when the casual structure of 
the system mirrors the formal structure of the 
computation. The system implements the computation, if 
there is a way of mapping the system states into the 
computations states so that the physical states which are 
causally related to the formal states are correspondingly 
related formally (Chalmers, 1996).  
The fact is that there is rich causal dynamics inside 
computers, as there is in the brain. There is real 
causation going on between various units of brain 
activity, precisely mirroring patterns of causation between 
the neurons. For each neuron, there is a specific causal 
link with other neurons. It is the causal patterns among 
the neurons in the brain that are responsible for any 
conscious experiences that may arise. The brain, as 
Marvin Minsky says, “Happens to be a meat machine” 
(Pamela, 1979). He points out that the brain is an 
electrical and chemical mechanism, whose organization 
is enormously complex and whose evaluation is barely 
understood, and as such, produces complex behavior in 
response to an even more complex environment. Artificial 
intelligence understands the nature of human intelligence 
in terms of the computational model of the mind.  
Now the question is: What would the world be like if we 
had intelligent machines? What would the existence of 
such machines say about the nature of human beings 
and their relation to the world around them? These 
questions have raised profound philosophical issues 
which will be discussed in due course. 
 
 
DESCARTES’ REMARKS ON MIND AND ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
 
So far, we have discussed artificial intelligence and its 
presuppositions of mind. In the Cartesian scheme of 
mind, there is no place for computationality because the 
thought act is due to the subjective thinking thing, which 
is the self. Again, this subjective thinking thing or the self 
is  that  which  “doubts,  understands,  affirms,  denies,  is  
 




willing, is unwilling and also imagines and has sensory 
perceptions” (Descartes, 1984). The existence of the 
thinking thing is the same as the existence of the 
subjective thinking thing, because it is the subject, who 
thinks. All these subjective activities are non-
computational because the subjective activity is the first 
person perspective. The mental processes, for 
Descartes, are intentional and are the free acts of the 
thinking subject. Therefore, this subjective attitude of 
mind cannot be mapped mechanically in an algorithmic 
system.  
Descartes’ concept of ‘I think’ presupposes subjective 
experience, because it is ‘I’ who experiences the world. 
Likewise, Descartes’ notion of ‘I’ negates the notion of 
computationality of the mind. The essence of mind is 
thought and the acts of thoughts are identified with acts 
of consciousness. Therefore, it follows that cognitive acts 
are conscious acts, but not computational or mechanical 
acts. Thus for Descartes, one of the most important 
aspects of cognitive states and processes is their 
phenomenality because of our judgments, understanding, 
etc. that can be defined and explained only in relation to 
consciousness and not in relation to computationality. We 
can only find computationality in machines and not in the 
mind, which wills, understands and judges. Descartes’ 
dictum, “I think, therefore, I am” (Descartes, 1984). not 
only establishes the existence of the self which thinks 
and acts but also its freedom from mechanistic laws to 
which the human body is subjected to. 
Moreover, when Descartes makes the distinction 
between mind and body, he did not claim that the idea of 
the mind is that of a ghost, although he did say that the 
idea of the body is that of a machine. Following this, Ryle 
in his book, ‘The Concept of Mind’ says that Descartes’ 
distinction between mind and body is a myth. He argues, 
“I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as 
‘the dogma of the ghost in the machine’. I hope to prove 
that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in 
principle” (Ryle, 1985). According to Ryle, Descartes’ 
distinction between mind and body commits a category-
mistake (Ryle, 1985). 
As Ryle said, “my destructive purpose is to show that a 
family of radical category mistake is the source of the 
double-life theory. The representation of a person as a 
ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine derived from 
this argument, because, as is true, a person’s thinking, 
feeling and purposive doing cannot be described solely in 
the idioms of physics, chemistry and physiology. 
Therefore they must be described in counterpart idioms. 
As the human body is a complex organized unit, so the 
human mind must be another complex organized unit, 
though one made of a different sort of stuff and with a 
different sort of structure. Likewise, again, as the human 
body, like any other parcel of matter, is a field of causes 
and effects, so the mind must be another field of causes 
and effects, though not (Heaven be praised) mechanical 





In Ryle’s understanding of mind, mind becomes as much 
mechanical as the body and is therefore non-different 
from the body. However, Descartes refutes the 
mechanistic reading of mind. As we have seen, 
Descartes is a dualist, rather than a mentalist. Descartes’ 
argument for the mind, which is distinct from the body, 
needs to be understood as an argument for the logical 
possibility of their separate existence and not for the fact 
that they exist independent of each other. The 
separability argument is as follows: “First, I know that 
everything, which clearly and distinctly understands is 
capable of being created by God so as to correspond 
exactly with my understanding of it. Hence, the fact that I 
can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from 
another is enough to make certain that two things are 
distinct, since they are capable of being separated at 
least by God. The question of what kind of power is 
required to bring about such a separation does not affect 
the judgment that the two things are distinct. Thus, simply 
by knowing that I exist and seeing at the same time that 
absolutely nothing else belongs to my nature or essence 
except that I am a thinking thing, I can infer correctly that 
my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking 
thing. It is true that I may have (or, to anticipate, that I 
certainly have) a body that is very closely joined to me, 
nevertheless, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct 
idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-
extended thing; and on the other hand, I have a distinct 
idea of the body, in so far as this is simply an extended 
non-thinking thing.  Accordingly, it is certain that I am 
really distinct from my body and can exist without it” 
(Descartes, 1984).  
Descartes has already proved in the ‘Second 
Meditation’ the existence of a thinking being that has a 
clear and distinct perception of the mind as a thinking, 
non-extended thing. This is a proof of the non-mechanical 
mind which is different from the body subject to 
mechanical laws.  Similarly, in the ‘Fifth Meditation’, he 
has shown that he has a clear and distinct idea of a body 
as extended and a non-thinking substance. This is to 
suggest that the mechanically existing body is 
ontologically distinct from the non-computational mind. 
The afore-described distinction between mind and body 
supposes that there is no ‘ghost’ in the human body or 
‘ghost in the machine’. However, Descartes did not admit 
the existence of ghost in the machine. Had Descartes 
admitted that there was a ghost in the human body, then 
the mind itself would become computational, and there 
would be no necessary distinction between the mind and 
the body, because the ghost itself is a body; but 
Descartes admits the distinction between mind and body 
and this shows that the mind is non-computational. It is 
mind, which has the capacity of intelligence and 
understanding. The Cartesian way of understanding the 
concept of intelligence is anti-physicalist and anti-
behaviourist and hence is anti-mechanical.  






computationality, because the human mind has innate 
ideas, which are embedded as the innate dispositions of 
the human mind. These ideas are a priori in the human 
mind and are the basic in-born propensities. Descartes 
observes, “my understanding of what a thing is, what 
truth is and what thought is, seems to be derived simply 
from my own nature, but my hearing a noise, as I do now, 
or seeing the sun, or feeling the fire, comes from the 
thing which is located outside of me, or so I have hitherto 
judged. Lastly, sirens, hippogriffs and the likes are my 
own invention” (Descartes, 1984). 
The afore-said observation of Descartes shows that 
innate ideas are not produced in us by the senses.  If the 
ideas were conveyed to us by the senses like heat, 
sound, etc., we would not have to refer to anything 
outside ourselves, because they too would be innate.  
For Descartes, “the ideas of pain, colours, sounds and 
the likes must be all the more innate, if, on the occasion 
of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of 
representing them to itself, for there is no similarity 
between these ideas and the corporeal motions.” 
(Descartes, 1985). Here, it follows that there is a 
distinction between innate and adventitious ideas and 
that innate ideas are universal ideas, whereas 
adventitious ideas are particular ideas.  As such, 
Descartes points out that hearing a noise, seeing the 
scene and feeling the fire are all particular ideas. 
(Descartes, 1984). Again, it must be noted that the 
perception of the particular is not possible without the 
universal. Innate universal ideas are a necessary 
requirement for the cognition of the particular objects in 
the world. 
Following Descartes, Chomsky established that 
language too is an innate faculty of the human species. 
Language becomes the essence that defines what it is to 
be human. Language is purely a syntactic system, 
according to Chomsky, and it therefore has a logical form 
which is universal and innate to the world. Language 
must also have an essence, something that makes 
language what it is and inheres in all languages. That 
essence is called ‘universal grammar’ (George and Mark, 
1999). Language does not arise from anything bodily. 
Studying the brain and body can give us no additional 
insight into language. The basic tenets of Chomsky’s 
linguistics are taken directly from Descartes. The only 
major tenet of Descartes that Chomsky rejects is the 
existence of the mental substance different from the 
human brain. Chomsky accepts that the human brain 
embodies the innate grammatical structures.   
Like Chomsky, Quine also affirms that there can be no 
philosophical study of the mind outside psychology: 
progress in philosophical understanding of the mind is 
inseparable from progress in psychology, because, 
psychology is a ‘natural science’ studying a natural 
phenomenon, that is, a physical human subject. Quine 
argued, “a dualism of mind and body is an idle 
redundancy” (Quine, 1994), and holds  “corresponding  to 




every mental state, however fleeting or remotely 
intellectual, the dualist is bound to admit the existence of 
a bodily state that is obtained when and only when the 
mental one is obtained. The bodily state is trivially 
specifiable in the dualist’s own terms, simply as the state 
of accompanying a mind, which is in the mental state. 
Instead, one state is ascribed to the mind, and then, we 
may equivalently ascribe the other to the body. The mind 
goes by the bound and will not be missed” (Quine, 1985). 
Quine’s position is that there are irreducible 
psychological properties, but all explanation is ultimately 
physical. His account of our mental concepts emerges as 
he examines how we acquire them, how we learn them, 
etc.  
He explains, “such terms are applied in the light of 
publicly observable symptoms: bodily symptoms strictly 
of bodily states and the mind strictly of mind state. 
Someone observes my joyful or anxious expression, or 
perhaps observes my gratifying or threatening situation 
itself, or hears me talk about it. He then applies the word 
‘joy’ or ‘anxiety’. After another such lesson or two, I find 
myself applying those words to some of my subsequent 
states in cases where no outward signs are to be 
observed beyond my report itself. Without the outward 
signs, to begin with, mentalistic terms could not be learnt 
at all” (Quine, 1994). Quine opposes the Cartesian 
dualism and therefore arrives at a behaviourist and 
functionalist conception of mind. He reduces the mental 
states like beliefs and other propositional attitudes to 
functional states. If both Chomsky and Quine are right 
about the nature of mind, then Descartes’ view of mind is 
wrong. That is, if that human brain is the cause of the 
mental states, then we cannot but arrive at the conclusion 
that the mental states are causally computable within a 
physical system. Chomsky and Quine define the mental 
qualities in terms of physical qualities. Therefore, they 
define mind in terms of the computational functions of the 
brain. However, Descartes claims that all ideas in the 
mind are mental representations (Descartes, 1984). 
In the ‘third meditation’, Descartes gives an extensive 
account of ideas. He says, “thus when I will (or am afraid, 
or affirm, or deny), there is always a particular thing 
which I take as the subject of my thought, but my thought 
includes something more than the likeness of that thing. 
Some thoughts in this category are called volitions or 
emotions, which others called judgments” (Descartes, 
1984). The afore-said quotation shows that some 
thoughts are images of things, that is, they represent 
things in the world. In other words, they have an object or 
content by which they are individuated as an idea of this 
particular thing or being. Moreover, Descartes also 
considers an ‘idea’ to refer to the ‘form’ of any thought. In 
his words, “I understand this term to mean the form of 
any given thought, the immediate perception of which 
makes me aware of the thought. Hence, whenever, I 
express something in words, and I understand what I am 
saying,  this  very  fact makes it certain that there is within 
 




me an idea of what is signified by the words in question” 
(Descartes, 1984). Therefore, the ideas, for Descartes 
are thus representational and intentional in character. 
Descartes, unlike Hobbes and Gassendi, is not a 
naturalist and keeps the thought content free from 
naturalization to which Hobbes and Gassendi are 
committed to. For them, thoughts are mechanical 
processes in the brain (Hobbes, 2003). In reply to 
Descartes, Gassendi says, “I thus realize that none of 
these things the imagination enables me to grasp is at all 
relevant to this knowledge of which I posses, and that the 
mind must therefore be most carefully diverted from such 
things if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as 
possible” (Hatfield, 2003). On the contrary, Descartes 
holds that individual acts of imagination, in as much as 
they are experiences, are relevant to grasping the nature 
of mind, because the mind is a thinking thing free from 
the mechanistic processes of the brain. What separates 
Descartes’ dualism from contemporary functionalism and 
identity theories is not so much his distinction between an 
immaterial mind and extended material body, as his 
notion of the human being is a unity of mind and body, 
with the properties not reducible to either mind or body, 
but dependent precisely on their ‘substantial’ union. 
Descartes holds that thinking cannot be explained 
mechanically. His argument that brutes cannot think is 
equivalent to an argument that machines cannot think. 
He thinks that no machine could have the capacity of 
using the linguistic and other signs to express thoughts 
and to give appropriate responses to meaningful speech, 
and the capacity to act intelligently or rationally in all sorts 
of situations (Descartes, 1985). But what is so special 
about human language use and what does it show that 
the behaviour of any mechanism fails to show? A 
machine could be construed to utter words corresponding 
to bodily change in its origin, but could never use spoken 
words or other signs that are composed as we do to 
declare our thoughts to others, because “It is not 
conceivable that the machine should produce different 
arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately 
meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as 
the dualist of men can do. Secondly, even though such 
machines might do some things as well as we do them, 
or perhaps even better, they would inevitably fail in 
others, which could reveal that they were acting not 
through understanding but only from the disposition of 
their organs. For the fact that reason is a universal 
instrument which can be used in all kind of situations, 
these organs need some particular disposition for each 
particular action, hence it is morally impossible to have 
enough different ones in a machine to make it act in all 
contingencies of life in the way in which our reason 
makes us act” ((Descartes, 1985). 
What Descartes is drawing attention to here is firstly, 
no machine could have the capacity to use linguistic and 
other signs to express thoughts and give appropriate 





would not have the capacity to act intelligently in all sorts 
of situations. Here, animal communication have not 
offered counter evidence to Descartes’ assumption that 
human language is based on an entirely distinct principle, 
nor has modern linguistic philosophers dealt with their 
observations in serious way. For Chomsky, the main 
lessons to be learnt from the ‘Cartesian’ tradition in 
linguistic are the idea of an innate, universal grammar 
and the idea that the study of the structure of this 
argument will reveal the structure of thought or mind. 
Descartes’ argument that brutes or machines cannot 
think in the light of the general question of what makes an 
utterance or a symbolic structure meaningful is 
noteworthy. The kind of automatic, rule governed 
computation or symbol processing that a turing machine 
instantiates and that can be performed by electronic 
computers would not count as thinking in Descartes’ 
sense, nor would the mechanical operations of a 
computer or robot, no matter how ingenious or intelligent, 
count as rational behaviour as he understands it. Not only 
did such a view makes thinking too narrow, it is based on 
precisely the kind of category mistake that Ryle attributes 
to the Cartesians which have been discussed earlier. 
Descartes is not a reductionist as he thinks that mind 
cannot be reduced to anything else and it must have an 
autonomous existence alongside the existence of the 
material body. The ‘I think’ of the mental reality does not 
deny the ‘I exist’ character in the world, rather it is an 
affirmation of it. In that sense, we cannot say that 
Descartes has subjectivized the mental world and thus 
made it into a private world. He made every effort to keep 
an objective constraint on the subjective mind and thus 
forestalled all skeptical questions about the existence of 
other minds. (Pradhan, 2001). This is because Cartesian 
doctrine of the mind and its inner experience do assume 
that we know other minds as much as we know our own. 
That is the reason why Descartes called the ‘I think’ the 
absolute basis of all our knowledge-claims about others 
and the external world. Thus, the self or mind is 
irreducible/not explainable in terms of the body or 
machines whether of Descartes or another’s. In view of 
this, we can say that the Cartesian philosophy of the 
mind is not based on a mistake and as such, it has 
shown the right way to the understanding of the mind.  
Of course Descartes would not have accepted the idea 
of mechanical or computational artificial intelligence, 
because he may still be considered an important 
forerunner of cognitive and computational view of the 
mind. The essence of the mind is rational thinking and 
rational thought or cognition can be studied 
independently of other phenomena, like sensation and 
emotions, in that Descartes stated that the body is 
dependent on mental phenomena, to which the mind is 
referred to as consciousness. Although Descartes did not 
identify mental thought with consciousness, emotions, 
awareness, etc., he regarded that all these are conditions 






descartes talks about the mind acting in some particular 
location in the brain. As such, this is comparable to 
contemporary literal talk about mental processes as 
computational activity in the brain. Moreover, Descartes 
would not have accepted the mechanical application of 
rules on syntactic structures as a sufficient condition for 
rational symbol manipulation. The kind of automatic, rule-
governed computation or symbol processing that a turing 
machine instantiates and that can be performed by 
electronic computers would not count as thinking from the 
Cartesian point of view. Therefore, Cartesian thinking is 
neither reducible to a narrowly understood rational 
capacity nor to consciousness because he clearly 
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